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ABSTRACT
This paper, in addition to describing the historical trajectory of party systems in the new European 
Union member states in general, describes the particular cases of five new Eastern-Central European 
(ECE) member states (NMS-5, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), and 
the recent emergence of new, second party systems that have recently emerged after the collapse of their 
first party systems. The main message of this paper is that the historical transformations of the NMS-
5 can best be described using a matrix of four party types: 1) populist, 2) Eurosceptic, 3) protest, and 
4) extreme-right. Although Eurosceptic parties have been in the forefront of recent analysis, the other 
three forms included in this matrix are equally important, and even enhance the understanding of 
Eurosceptic parties in the NMS-5. Like the international literature, the focus of this paper is also on 
party developments, but includes a complex approach that accounts not only for political, but also for 
socio-economic, developments in the NMS-5.
Key words: Eurosceptic, populist, extreme-right and protest parties, the first and second party system, 
Golem parties, critical elections, democracy capture.
INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUAL STRETCHING IN THE ANALYSIS OF EUROSCEPTIC 
PARTIES
The decline of democracy in the European Union’s (EU) new member states (NMS) can be 
analysed from various sides, but one of the most important aspects to consider is the rise of 
Eurosceptic and protest parties within a general trend of increasing populism in this region. 
In the period following the 2008 global economic crisis, the attitudes of parties in Europe has 
been increasingly critical of both the EU and domestic political systems: “On both sides, an 
increasing national focus and a rise in populism as well as anti-EU sentiment are evident in 
all parts of society. The EU is more and more perceived as a problem. The weakest hold that 
the EU, and especially core countries in the euro zone, are imposing too much on them and 
asking too much from them” (Emmanouilidis, 2011, p. 13). These so-called critical parties 
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deviate from mainstream parties in that they represent a kind of political reaction to the 
management of the global economic crisis by expressing the dissatisfaction of the masses, 
which are suffering the crisis’s long-term effects. While the non-mainstream critical parties 
in Europe share some similarities and common features, they also show, rather directly, the 
idiosyncrasies of individual countries and regions. It is no surprise that international political 
scientists and scholars of European studies have been unable to cope with this rapid change 
in the world system. Hence there is no consensus regarding how to term these parties 
theoretically or as to how to treat them politically. Some analysts, to emphasize the common 
features of these marginal critical parties, have collected very different and diverging critical 
parties under the same hat and have rung the bell to proclaim that these parties represent a 
serious danger for Europe. Whereas other analysts have concentrated on the idiosyncrasies 
of individual parties or party types, they have obscured the source of this common trend 
despite the surfacing of the very important socio-economic circumstances that prompted 
the development of these parties in the given countries. Anyway, the debate on Eurosceptic 
and populist parties in the 2010s has restructured party theory in Europe. This paper tries to 
outline the theoretical consequences of this debate for parties in the NMS in general and for 
the NMS-5’s parties in particular.1
There has been an outpouring of literature and a widespread discussion about non-
mainstream critical parties under the various names of populist, extremist, and protest parties, 
but the most frequent and fashionable name has been Eurosceptic. In the last decade, the 
study of Eurosceptic parties has become a growth industry in international political science. 
The terms populist party and protest party have long been used in political science—and 
in the last decades, the term extremist party has also frequented agendas, understood in 
contrast to a radical party as an anti-systemic party. The term Eurosceptic party is, however, 
relatively new. It was first mentioned in the British daily national newspaper The Times in 
1985; in earlier periods of the European Parliament (EP) the party term “nationalist” was used 
to describe opponents of EU integration. This new term reflects the fact that the party system 
has also been Europeanized; therefore the cleavage line between pro-EU and anti-EU parties 
has become crucial. This is all, to a great extent, thanks to British parties as the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) was, and remains, the most influential Eurosceptic party in the EP. 
The Eurosceptic party has turned out to be the brand name of actively and manifestly anti-
EU parties across the European continent. Therefore, more and more, analysts have tended 
to call all critical, non-mainstream parties Eurosceptic or, interchangeably, populist parties—
combining a conceptual chaos with a bugaboo.2
1  I have discussed the impact of the global crisis on the socio-political developments and decline of democracy 
in NMS (Ágh, 2014) and the specificities of the Hungarian party system (Ágh, 2015a,b). There has been literature 
on the radical transformations of party systems on all continents – e.g. Seawright (2012) in Latin America – that 
indicates the diverging specificities of this process. This paper deals with the basic party-system transformations 
in NMS-5 countries.
2  Eurosceptic discourse began with a speech by Margaret Thatcher in Bruges on 22 September 1988, but the 
term was oft used much later. The paper of Paul Taggart in 1998 is the theoretical foundation of Eurosceptic party 
research, jointly with Aleks Sczerbiak in the early 2000s with the distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism 
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1. THE GENERAL FEATURES OF THE NMS-5’S PARTY SYSTEMS
1 . 1  T h e  N e w  C o n c e p t u a l  Fra m e w o r k  f o r  t h e  Pa r t y  D e v e l o p m e n t  i n  t h e  E U
This whirling of many names, spurred by analysts’ various focuses, has produced a situation of 
uncertainty in both politics and political science, notwithstanding that the real political life has 
produced on the other side a “natural selection,”—the 2014 EP elections was akin to a medical 
check-up for European parties and party systems. The influential project, Voter Attitudes and 
EP Elections in Times of Crisis asked, “will there be critical elections in the European Union?” 
(Schmitt, 2013). Actually, the 2014 EP elections were maintenance elections, not critical 
elections. It can be seen at first glance that despite a widespread sense of crisis and feelings 
of dissatisfaction in Europe, the EP elections did not unleash a major wave of change in the 
European party system as many analysts predicted, expected, and later described—claims 
European journalists have constantly repeated. There have been no fundamental changes to 
the structure of the EP or to the alignment of its main political groups because mainstream 
parties, by and large, have kept their positions (Bertsou, 2014).  Although the critical parties 
have gained some space, their internal fights have significantly increased. Their quantitative 
gain has to be contrasted with their qualitative losses. 
Over the last five years, journalists’ absolute priority in their discourse regarding crisis 
management in the EU has been mistakenly focused on the EP elections, but the expected 
tsunami of change in the EP and the predicted Eurosceptic parties’ landslide did not occur. The 
2009 EP elections took place in what was still a pre-crisis mood. The following elections, held 
in May 2014, reflected a genuine post-crisis malaise. June 2014’s Eurobarometer 81 indicated 
growing optimism as both the “Image of the EU” (35 versus 25 per cent) and the “Future of 
the EU” (56 versus 38 per cent) trends were positive and improving. This trend improved 
further in Eurobarometer 82, in November 2014 (with readings of 39 versus 22 per cent and 
56 versus 37 per cent, respectively). The European malaise, however, has been exaggerated 
in the media and, to some extent, in politics. The EU public during these five years has been 
largely accustomed to the crisis’s effects, and has absorbed or digested the radical changes 
originating from drastic crisis management measures.3
Accordingly, the latest EP election has been mistaken for a critical election, yet the size 
of critical parties and the quantity of their seats has not changed to such an extent that they 
provoked a power shift in the EP. No doubt, however, there has been a deep polarization in 
European public opinion. The political and policy distance has grown not only between the 
mainstream parties and the critical parties, but also between the soft- and hard-Eurosceptic 
parties. The extremist character of some hard-Eurosceptic parties has also become much more 
marked than before—thereby shocking EU populations and governments with their aggressive 
(see Leconte, 2010, pp. 3-10). Leconte explains that “in today’s political and academic discourse, Euroscepticism 
has become equated with different forms of opposition to European integration”. It has been inflated and blurred 
with many contradictions, finally forcing Taggart and Sczerbiak to outline “what Euroscepticism is not” (Leconte 
2010, pp. 5-6). See also Kopecky and Mudde (2002) or the theory of the “unortodox parties” (Pop-Eleches, 2010).
3  The Eurobarometer has reported that the worst is over in the EU public opinion, since “trust and optimism 
are growing across the European Union”, IP/14/543, Brussels, 12 May 2014. See also Toshkov et al., 2014.
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styles and the racist ideologies. Nowadays, in general, Euroscepticism is high on the agenda 
in both European politics and European studies, not because of its actual political weight 
or influence in the EP or European politics, but because of the shocking and contaminating 
character of Eurosceptics’ “anti-European” views and values. Interestingly enough, aggressive 
extremist parties have appeared not only in member states hit hardest by the global crisis 
(like Greece, Hungary, and Bulgaria), but due to the migrant issue in the most crisis-resilient 
member-states, they are appearing in the Nordic countries, too.4
Actually, the eighth EP was organized into 7 factions with 52 independent Members 
of the European Parliament (MEP) and these political groups have not experienced a 
political tsunami. The two biggest factions—the European People’s Party (EPP, 221) and the 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D, 191)—embrace 412 MEPs. The third 
largest faction is the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE, 67) with 479 MEPs. 
Finally, the fourth largest is The Greens—European Free Alliance (Green/EFA, 50) with 529 
MEPs. These party groups may be considered mainstream and they still comprise the majority 
of the 751 MEPs—about 70 per cent—in the present EP. Indeed, this grand coalition has been 
alive and well; it dominated in legislation while the so-called fringe groups just tried to gain 
visibility (VoteWatch, 2015, p. 3). The so-called critical parties have formed three factions 
with 222 MEPs. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR, 70), based on the British 
Conservatives, and the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
(GUE/NGL, 52), based on the smaller leftist and green parties, are confronting the EU from 
both right and left as a velvet opposition of moderately soft-Eurosceptic parties with 122 
MEPs, 16 per cent, altogether. The real Eurosceptic parties are beyond these political borders. 
Although analysts tried to define Eurosceptic party subtypes immediately following the last 
election, the actual demand to form EP factions generated a clear divergence among these 
parties that resulted in three very real subtypes. These three types of parties were not ready 
to cooperate with each other in the European Parliament and emphasized their distinctions 
from each other. Namely, during the EP-faction-organizing period, some Eurosceptic parties 
reacted angrily to the views of the others. Thus, under the pressure of EP regulations (twenty-
five MEPs from seven member states were needed to form an EP faction), a natural selection 
emerged.
In June 2014, there was a strong divergence between the three main Eurosceptic groups 
(100 MEPs, 13 per cent) during the process of organizing EP factions). The first of these three 
groups organized the seventh EP faction—Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFFD, 
48)—dominated by the UKIP. The second group, of so-called radical Eurosceptic parties with a 
centrist effort, were dominated by France’s National Front. Not only did the first and second 
group fail to find a common platform, but relations between the second and third group were 
4  About the critical elections literature see Róbert and Papp (2012), no surprise that the critical election 
model has been applied to Hungary as a classical case. I will return to this issue later when discussing the NMS-5 
countries. Many well-informed Institutes have pointed out that there was no Eurosceptic or rightist-populist-
extremist tsunami at the 2014 EP election. The chart of Bruegel (2014) shows that the relationship of political 
groups since 1979 has been rather constant and balanced, especially to the mainstream parties. Gros (2014, 
CEPS) has also indicated that no significant change can be noticed in the power relations in EP.
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even more problematic—namely between the more consolidated “radical” group and the 
group of the remaining “extremist” Eurosceptic MEPs. Characteristically, the second group 
could not form a faction despite having more than twenty-five MEPs from six countries; 
they were not ready to accept racist and extremist partners. Hence, the biggest event in 
this faction organizing process was the manifest split between the centrist-leaning radical 
group and the extremist group—especially considering that the European media frequently 
refer to the Hungarian Jobbik (3 MEPs) and the Greek Golden Dawn (3 MEPs) as neo-Nazi or 
fascist parties. Finally, these real extremists, as the residual “independents,” were separated 
informally into a very heterogeneous third group. In such a way, both the second and third 
Eurosceptic group remained without an EP faction, called in the EP parlance, “Non-Inscrits” 
(NI, 52). As to racism, the gap between the more consolidated radical Eurosceptic parties and 
the real extremists—Golden Dawn, Jobbik, and the like— may be larger at times than that 
between mainstream parties and the more moderate Eurosceptic parties—such as the UKIP 
and National Front—despite the many similar issues Eurosceptic parties advocate.5
In my view, in European studies, the non-mainstream, critical parties at large have been 
discussed rather uncritically so far, without properly or carefully distinguishing among 
them. This has created a situation of uncertainty in the post EP-election political analysis 
and generated the myth of extremist parties’ success. The Big Four—populist, Eurosceptic, 
extremist, and protest parties—haunt European political science because there are no proper 
contrasts drawn between moderate and extremist critical parties. The latter comprise the 
relatively small number of truly Eurosceptic parties, which are represented by twenty to 
thirty MEPs. Among them, the really extremist Eurosceptic parties are usually organized and 
reorganized on the margin of their domestic political systems, with the exception of smaller 
countries experiencing severe crisis. These extremist Eurosceptic parties fight each other as 
fiercely as they fight the EU—after all, they are primarily based on aggressive nationalism 
and xenophobia. Also, it has to be taken into consideration that most of the noise—both in 
politics and in political science— about Euroscepticism is generated by the British case (44 
Eurosceptic MEPs are from the UK) even though the British exit (Brexit) should be regarded 
separately from Euroscepticism in general. On the other side, the real danger is that the usual 
approach obscures Eurosceptic tendencies in mainstream party blocs and in soft-Eurosceptic 
parties in NMS, like the Fidesz or Law and Justice Party (PiS).
In the new member states the four types of parties, as a party matrix, make various 
combinations of party profiles. For example, some are more populist, but less extreme than 
others. These so-called critical parties react to the common problems of the EU crisis from all 
four sides, yet they present four different priorities related to the crisis. Nonetheless, while 
they mostly share the same critical less Europe tendencies, these parties still do not overlap 
5  In big outlines, first group is the EFFD with UKIP-24, Five Star Movement-17, Party of Free Citizens-1, Order 
and Justice-2; Sweden Democrats-2. The second group is composed e.g. from Front National (FN, 24); Party for 
Freedom (PVV-4); Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ-4); North League (Lega Nord-5); Congress of the New Right (KNP, 
4 MEPs); Flemish Interest (VB-1). Finally, the third group consists e.g. of Jobbik (3), Golden Dawn (3), National 
Democratic Party of Germany (1); Democratic Unionist Party (1), Communist Party of Greece (2) and KSCM (3).
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completely—though they usually oppose the mainstream parties that regularly represent 
the more Europe, pro-EU tendency. The characteristic of conceptual stretching in most 
analyses—resulting in theoretical chaos—is the interchangeable use of all four terms. This 
interchangeable use of terms is manifest in the 2014 EP post-election analyses, in which all 
four party names were used together and in various combinations, despite the divergence 
of these four types (for example, not all emerging protest parties are Eurosceptic). These 
journalistic misnomers appear even in theoretical EP analyses: many critical, non-mainstream 
parties have been classified, rather randomly, as one or two of the four party types.6
After the latest EP elections the Big Four “critical” parties can be viewed as parts of the 
following party matrix.
Po p u l i s t  Pa r t i e s
Populist parties are not only anti-elitist and simplistic in sloganeering. A deeper analysis 
reveals that they can also be categorized by their contrasts and defined as either responsive 
or responsible parties, with respective short-term or long-term intents, or by acknowledging 
the conflict between direct political action and strategic vision (Bardi et. al, 2014). Populism 
may only be a marginal feature in the West (Mudde, 2007 and Giusto et al., 2013), but it has 
been the main party development trend in Eastern Europe, where governments have failed to 
meet the high expectations of NMS populations. In the NMS, populism—an endemic feature 
of all parties, including mainstream parties—has reached its peak, as seen in the “populism 
from above” of the governing parties. As a reaction to the global economic crisis, “Countries 
like Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic appeared to take a ‘populist turn’ . . . the 
incidents of threats to the EU’s democratic principles and values has increased,” (EPC, Balfour 
and Stratulat, 2012, p. 2). It is particularly true in the NMS that “Populists can easily project 
these problems onto ‘Europe,’ which in this case merely represents fear of the outside world 
in general . . . What has taken the form of an anti-EU vote constitutes in reality a protest 
against socio-economic problems at home,” (Gros, 2014, pp. 2-3). In fact, the NMS parties can 
be analysed first from the side of populism—recently, populist protest actions have led to a 
rise in Eurosceptic parties in NMS.
E u r o s ce p t i c  Pa r t i e s
As Eurosceptic parties usually oppose particular EU policies or EU membership, their most 
common subtypes are the soft- and hard-Eurosceptic parties, respectively. Again, beyond the 
UK, hard-Euroscepticism is, above all, a product of the impoverishment and social exclusion 
generated by the global economic crisis. Before the global economic crisis, various sorts of 
soft-Euroscepticism were tolerated relatively well by governments in Western Europe through 
opt-out options and differentiated integration. Eurosceptics have only come to the fore to 
6  For instance, the Schuman papers – Deloy (2014) and Brustier, Deloy and Escalona (2014) - are quite informa-
tive as following the election events but they represent the classical case of theoretical misnomers by journalism 
because they have indeed used the basic terms interchangeably, somewhat chaotically.
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oppose the emergence of tough crisis management measures in some public policies. As NMS 
had not fully completed their EU adjustment processes before the crisis—the outbreak of the 
global economic crisis closely followed their EU accession—they were hit especially hard. As a 
result, popular dissatisfaction and Eurosceptic parties are already on the move in NMS.
Pr o t e s t  Pa r t i e s
Protest parties arise from the internal logic of the party system. When the party system has 
been eroded and corroded, new parties with a particular protest profile may spring up, though 
they usually survive for a shorter time than other parties. Or, protest parties may form to 
mobilize opposition or support when a very important policy issue comes to the fore. While, 
by definition, protest parties are not mainstream or well established, they are not necessarily 
populist, extremist, or Eurosceptic. Several kinds of protest parties are characteristic to the 
NMS, where there have been critical elections due to the erosion and de-legitimation of 
mainstream parties. In general, the initial party systems to emerge in young democracies are 
fragile due to their weak social links. Consequently, these parties have been elitist, provoking 
angry protest in the NMS, where protest parties have been emerging frequently in recent 
years.
E x t r e m i s t  Pa r t i e s
Like the first three types in this four-party matrix, the rise in the number of extremist parties 
was also activated by the impact of the global financial crisis across Europe—with Greece 
being a classic case. Extremist groups can identify with the Left or the Right, but leftist-
extremism appears mostly in the West as post-communist NMS grant little credibility to leftist 
extremists (the only major exception is the Czech Republic’s Communist Party of Moravia and 
Bohemia, the KSCM). Extremist parties have a variety of profiles and priority issues, ranging 
from nationalist and racist to social and anti-global. Some extremist parties represent minority 
groups while others champion anti-minority group movements. Anyway, in NMS these parties 
are most often the prisoners of history, using “the politics of historical memory” as their main 
ideological weapon in domestic politics or in their fights against extremists in neighbouring 
countries. Altogether, the case of extremist parties best demonstrates the international 
incompatibility of extreme nationalist parties—in most cases, they see their main enemy in 
the same party group.7
The most characteristic case of conceptual stretching is analysts’ warning cry that there 
is a growing number of extremist Eurosceptic parties in the EP. This claim is now a popular 
belief (perpetuated by the European media) and the most fashionable topic in the European 
7  The protracted social crisis has created a high level of xenophobia in NMS-5. Two Hungarian institutes – Po-
litical Capital (www.politicalcapital.hu) and Policy Solutions (www.policysolutions.hu) have been deeply involved 
into international research network on DEREX (Demand for Right-Wing Extremism, see www.derexindex.eu) and 
produced many papers also on the extreme-right parties, including Jobbik. Among the big party families the 
extreme right is less homogeneous even in Western Europe than the other families (see Ennser, 2012). As the 
above two Institutes describe them, this feature characterises the NMS-5 extreme right parties much more.
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studies. Analysts have often used the terms populist and Eurosceptic interchangeably and, in 
many cases, the basic distinction between soft- and hard-Euroscepticism been lost. Unlike in 
the West, some mainstream parties in the NMS may have populist and Eurosceptic leanings, 
moreover they may advocate extreme views with a protest profile—as the Law and Justice 
Party (PiS) in Poland does. Other mainstream NMS parties are soft-Eurosceptic parties, like 
Fidesz. Thus, given the context of NMS, the dangers of conceptual stretching are even graver—
theoretically and politically. Even if one neglects the interchange of party categorizations in 
these analyses, it is still necessary to insist on the distinction and deep divergences between 
Eastern and Western Europe in regard to party development (Polyakova, 2015).
1 . 2  T h e  S p e c i f i c i t i e s  o f  G o l e m  Pa r t i e s  a n d  H e g e m o n i c  Pa r t y  Sy s t e m s  i n  t h e 
N M S - 5
The widespread prejudice against populist parties, and critical parties in general, is still haunting 
European studies where populist and critical parties are perceived with a one-size-fits-all 
attitude that fails to properly distinguish between the two party types in Eastern and Western 
Europe. The distinction between Eastern Europe and Western Europe, or between new and 
old member states, is becoming even more important due to the widening gap between the 
EU’s core and its periphery. The reasons for these two different types of populism can be 
found in the EU’s early systemic changes. To the masses, the ten years of membership has 
appeared to a great extent as the failure of the catching-up process. This deep dissatisfaction 
has produced within critical parties different sorts of Euroscepticism. Nowadays this failure 
is the point of departure in the analysis of NMS’s parties and party systems, including their 
unique Eurosceptic features.
Neglecting the distinctions between Eastern and Western Europe misleads analysts. 
In Western Europe, social and national populism is based on: 1) resilient post-welfare (or 
5-75-20) societies’ struggle to cope with the problems of so-called well-being; and on 2) the 
relatively recent issue of the mass migration of outsiders to Western Europe. Quite contrarily, 
Eastern Europe’s social and national populism is based on: 1) crisis-prone, premature, welfare 
societies, or pre-welfare (or 5-55-40) societies, that are still very far from achieving well-
being characterized by sustainability and life-satisfaction; and on 2) the age-old tensions 
with local outsiders—autochthon ethnic minorities, such as the Roma, Jewish populations, 
and local minority groups from neighbouring countries. Also, in this respect, analysts cannot 
apply an evolutionary model to these two types by expecting the NMS to catch up, as if it 
would just take time for these states to reach the next stage of development, since neither 
the NMS-5 populations nor their parties are simply in an earlier stage of Europeanization 
or democratization. Actually, the NMS populations and their parties have been seriously 
diverging from the “Western European Road” since the very beginning of systemic change. 
Social consolidation, civil society, and local democracy in the NMS are in worse shape now 
than they were 25 or 10 years ago. The “transformative power” of the EU has shown its very 
tough limits (Kartal, 2014).
The usual typologies of parties and party systems applied to mainstream parties do not 
work for the NMS-5. The main task of these typologies is to identify the special role the parties 
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and party systems played during the last quarter-century of systemic change. The formal-
legal approach of this narrow political history does not help, since the historical trajectory of 
the NMS countries was determined by the region’s socio-economic history. After their first 
decade of EU membership, effective institutionalization is still missing in the NMS-5. There, 
formal-legal institutions were built like sand palaces, lacking solid social backgrounds and 
patterns of civic behaviour. Against the context of unrealized high expectations for some kind 
of welfare society, national-social populism offers ideological drugs to falsely recompensate 
the population with their mirage of a new age. Thus, in the NMS, the perceived reality differs 
very much from the genuine socio-economic reality. This contrast between the popular dream 
and reality grew during the NMS’s first decade of EU membership. Deep malaise has appeared 
in both Eastern and Western Europe, but in very different ways—the East has been haunted 
by the idea of an increasing gap between the core and periphery and by the threat of further 
peripheralization. So, disappointment over failing to easily and rapidly catch up, compounded 
by the global economic crisis, has led to greater malaise in Eastern Europe than in the West.8
Moreover, the populism and Euroscepticism of the new Eastern European member 
states is also different from that of Southern Europe’s new member states. In both regions, 
EU membership has brought with it a series of achievements, but it has also caused region-
specific negative externalities. First of all, the Eastern European enlargement—with its 
development closely integrated with production structures in Western Europe—has produced 
dependency. Namely, Eastern Europe has become the semi-periphery of the “near West,” 
and above all, of Germany and Austria. It has produced a very marked underdevelopment 
by drastically splitting individual NMS-5 countries into two parts: modernized regions and 
undeveloped islands of poverty. Thus split, a new member state is deeply divided internally 
between their developing and their declining regions. Thus, the crucial issue for the NMS is 
internal “territorial” social cohesion, or the ability to unite not only with the EU, but to also 
unite the modernized and undeveloped regions within their own country.
In the new political geography, the NMS-5 have been splitting into either West-of-the-East 
or East-of-the-East groups. The former has integrated their development rather closely with 
Western European development, and are, relatively, catching up. The East-of-the East group 
has absolutely declined—evidenced by their losses in competitiveness, high unemployment, 
and a worsening standard of living. There, despite attempts to cover these trends with national 
statistics, a drastic social polarization is underway. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the relative, fragile, and precarious satisfaction of the NMS-5 populations in the 
West of the East and their absolute dissatisfaction in the East of the East. Nonetheless, in this 
political geography, the general disappointment shared by NMS populations after ten years 
of EU membership determined the domestic party landscape. This basic domestic-territorial 
8  Many policy institutes (Bertelsmann, FH and WEF) have analysed this contrast between the formal and 
substantive democratization in NMS, see first of all the data of the EIU (2014,2015). The Quarter-Century in all 
dimensions has been very well described in the literature in great detail, see Banac (2014), CEPI (2014), Darvas 
(2014), European Catching Up Index (2014), GKI (2013), Grabbe (2014), IMF (2014a,b), Mannheim University 
(2014) and Munck (2012).
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and social divergence is also responsible for the distinctions between soft and hard social 
movements, parties, and ideologies in the NMS that are West of the East and the NMS that are 
East of the East. These differences are easily detected on the electoral map of the countries 
given the varieties of populism and Euroscepticism in national and EP elections. The hard-
populist and Eurosceptic parties have found popular support in countries East of the East, 
among the “absolute losers”—the unemployed; and the soft populist and Eurosceptic parties 
in West-of-the-East countries have gained the support of the relative losers—the declassed 
middle strata. This phenomena can be seen best on the electoral map of Poland, which is 
completely partitioned from east to west. Generally, due to the global economic crisis, the 
NMS populations have been living in a state of permanent insecurity (with an increasingly real 
precariat class in the middle) in these precariously positioned countries.
Actually, to discover what could be called the secret history of the NMS-5 region, one has 
to identify and define the region’s political actors, parties and party systems in a way that 
the West’s standard definitions cannot. This secret history can be described as a negative 
tendency of the emergence of Golem parties with their so-called hegemonic party systems. 
These parties have been the most relevant actors in their young yet declining democracies 
over the last quarter-century of the NMS’s histories. The particular features of these parties, 
and their hegemonic party systems dominated by the strongest Golem parties, have structured 
the political and social life as a whole in the NMS. By the 2010s, they emerged, in different 
ways, as the dominant actors of the NMS party landscapes. The biggest NMS-5 parties, as the 
monopolistic political actors, have become almighty and comprehensive social actors with 
large, strong, informal networks, allowing them to embrace the economy and the media by 
merging politics and business (see Rupnik and Zielonka, 2013). Moreover, in this system of 
“crony capitalism” (The Economist, 2014) they have organized their own special pseudo-civil 
society from above as well. All of the NMS have suffered from very weak social embeddedness 
(Casal Bértoa, 2014), hence the emergence of socially and ideologically unanchored elites 
organized by political and economic oligarchs (Herman, 2015). However, as recent analyses 
have pointed out, these Golem parties have created an effective countrywide corruption 
network based on public procurement and EU transfers. In this way, Golem parties have, to a 
great extent, been able to control paralysed societies.9
In the NMS, parties’ quasi-monopolization of the political scene alienated the population 
from politics. These populations’ distrust of their new democratic institutions generated 
long-standing and culminating negative effects such as a systemic class bias in electoral 
participation—the region’s biggest problem regarding political representation. A recent 
European Science Foundation (ESF) report warned that many NMS citizens “still feel frustrated 
and dissatisfied” about their economic and social security (ESF, 2012, p. 42). The socio-
economically marginalized, a silent strata of “absolute losers,” have had no chance to express 
their views at the national political level and Golem parties have also rendered the increasingly 
9  Ten Years of Membership has been evaluated in two important volumes – with the introductions of Rupnik 
and Zielonka (2013) and Epstein and Jacoby (2014) respectively – that have given a new conceptual framework 
for the NMS analysis.
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impoverished middle strata of “relative losers” politically powerless. Altogether, in the terms 
of a participation and representation paradox: the more the absolute and relative losers have 
needed political representation as a pressure group, the less they have participated in political 
life, often because they have been represented by parties or other political organizations. 
Although their lack-of-representation situation has occasionally pushed impoverished 
masses to the streets to launch anomic actions, there were no major disturbances in the 
NMS in the 1990s when the populations’ social patience was rather high. But from the 2000s 
onward, the outbursts of populist protest have increasingly taken the form of extreme-right 
demonstrations and extreme-right organizations. When this disempowerment reached 
its peak in the 2010s, there was a rise in soft- and hard-Eurosceptic parties and anomic 
movements; all sorts of populist and extremist organizations emerged, and protest parties 
made a volcanic appearance. This ideal model of the deep political crisis in the NMS has to be 
nuanced from both the side of the Golem parties and that of paralysed populations, since it 
shows only the bare bones.10
Thus, I have identified three consecutive crises, which have occurred in the past quarter-
century: a transformation crisis, a post-accession crisis, and a global accommodation crisis. 
I have written a progress report (with a large database taken from the major international 
policy institutes) on this triple crisis process in NMS (Ágh, 2013a,b). Based on this data, 
my comparative paper concentrates on the NMS parties’ transformations after the global 
economic crisis, since all NMS countries show similar trends. To analyse the party systems, their 
entire political landscape had to be overviewed before applying the conceptual framework 
elaborated above. The full matrix of the party transformations has to be described with the 
four types of parties: populist, Eurosceptic, protest, and extremist. Despite the increasing 
salience of Eurosceptic parties, populism is still key since populism runs through the whole 
history of the NMS’ democratization. Euroscepticism is not just relatively new in the NMS, but 
the EU-based cleavage is still much less important than the winner-loser social cleavage in both 
national and EP elections. These four types of parties still share a common socio-economic 
background in that they are missing social consolidation, with some specific features and 
patterns of behaviour in the NMS region, although this varies widely by individual state. In the 
2010s, the socio-economic shock of the global economic crisis prompted a prolonged party 
and political crisis in the NMS with these big Golem-type parties. Under pressure to manage 
the crisis, the first party systems eroded in the 2000s and, due to popular dissatisfaction, they 
finally collapsed in the 2010s. But the efforts to organize Golem parties and their hegemonic 
party systems have continued in the NMS’s newly emerging second party systems following 
the critical elections. This recent political crisis has been based on a worsening social crisis 
10  There has recently been a huge party literature on NMS, see e.g. Gherghina (2014), Haughton (2014), Kop-
ecky et al. (2012), Nakrosis and Gudzinskas (2013) and Sedelmeier (2014). The recent analysis of Lise Herman on 
“party-citizen dynamics” and on the “culturalist” approach to party developments has overviewed the huge NMS 
party literature (Herman, 2015, pp. 14-17). The party composition and life-time of the European governments 
is a very well researched topic in political science, the basic data have been published every year in European 
Journal of Political Research.
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(of impoverishment and social exclusion leading to social populism) from below and it has 
culminated in an intensified identity crisis (of renationalization and xenophobia leading to 
national populism) from above. Indeed, the short overview of the NMS-5 party systems 
clearly demonstrates that political science can be a dismal science.11
2. THE COLLAPSE OF THE FIRST PARTY SYSTEM AND THE EMERGENCE 
 OF SECOND PARTY SYSTEMS IN THE NMS-5
2 . 1  C r i t i ca l  E l e c t i o n s  a n d  D e m o c ra c y  C a p t u r e s  i n  t h e  N M S - 5
A critical election, which collapses the party system and produces significant political turmoil, 
differs from a party transformation in general—a critical election basically signals the change 
of the basic party system as a whole. Critical elections have been discussed in international 
political science, but are an under-researched topic in the NMS-5 with all of the region’s 
specificities. There are three parallel processes that make an election critical and pave the 
way for an ensuing collapse of party systems: ideological, social, and political reconfigurations.
1) A new ideological configuration occurs when new issues come to the fore with new 
values and patterns of behaviour and new dividing lines emerge in ideology and public 
discourse.
2) A new social configuration follows radical transformations to the social structure that 
generate deep changes in the social base of parties and transform the main social 
cleavages. 
3) A new political configuration is often evidenced by the appearance of new party 
images, a general shifting in positions on the Left-Right scale, and substantial changes 
to the links between interest groups and parties.
The critical election causes a new party or a new coalition to ascend to power, resulting in 
the collapse of the existing party system and the emergence of a new party system. The impact 
of a critical election can be summarized as three dramatic and fundamental transformations 
in the size and nature of parties in just one—or two consecutive—elections: 
1) Among the largest parties, there are substantial reconfigurations in the leading parties. 
Sometimes the former governing party disappears and the big mainstream parties 
rearrange themselves.
2) Within the zone of middle-sized or small parties, many new protest and extremist 
parties appear or grow in size. Basically, the smaller critical parties transform. 
3) Finally, modifications to the party system’s overall structure and character result in the 
realignment of parties. 
Most often, emphasis is placed on the defeat of governing parties, the victory of critical— 
or opposition—parties, and increased support for minor radical or extremist parties. Greater 
detail and elaboration, however, reveals that critical elections reflect a change in: the 
11  The data on the general impoverishment in the NMS are available in OECD, 2011, 2014. Nowadays the sat-
isfaction with standard of living has been very much below the EU average in NMS, while the risk of falling into 
poverty has been among the highest in the EU (Eurobarometer 81, 2014, pp. 25,27). The social-cultural factors 
(e.g. civic political culture) have also been mentioned in several papers as well-being, life-satisfaction or social 
progress, i.e. those factors closely interwoven with social investment, social productivity and the like (Herman, 
2015).
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character of populism, the prevalence of extremism, and the popularity of protest parties. 
Moreover, in recent years and due to the increasing salience of EU membership in the NMS, 
the issue of Euroscepticism was (for the first time) relatively high on the political agenda in 
these critical elections. In addition, the EP elections—second-order elections, which typically 
have much lower turnout in NMS than the parliamentary elections—can produce even bigger 
party transformations; hence these “pre-elections” can also indicate the results of upcoming 
critical national elections. From a bird’s-eye view, the basic issues of the NMS-5’s historical 
trajectory are the deep ideological split between the Left and the Right (Savage, 2014), the 
decreasing popularity of political elites, and low participation in elections.12
In an effort to overview the NMS-5’s first ten years of EU membership, Abby Innes 
identified two types of political developments; in doing so, she also explains the type of 
critical elections held in the NMS-5. Namely, the party state capture and the corporate state 
capture have defined the main NMS historical trajectories, a sharp contrast from the officially 
declared Europeanization and democratization processes. In the party-state-capture model 
political motivations dominate among the new elite. Because parties want to permanently 
control the state’s machinery as a whole, they transform the state according to their values 
and expectations—as seen in Poland, Hungary, and most probably, in Slovenia. In the party-
state-capture model, oligarchs are mostly in hiding. They are less like to play a direct political 
role and simply enjoy the privileges of state or agency capture. So oligarchs’ rent-seeking or 
profit-seeking drive appears first through the domination of the state. Therefore, “The EU’s 
leverage is necessarily limited in the cases of party state capture” (Innes, 2014, p. 101). In the 
opposite model, the corporate-state-capture model, economic motivation dominates state 
transformations. The powerful corporations and almighty oligarchs appear on the political 
scene rather directly, like in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In this model neither party 
politicians nor oligarchs endeavour to transform the state machinery ideologically—according 
to their values and expectations—or long-term. Instead, their short-term rent-seeking drive 
or profit-seeking drive comes directly to the fore; business oligarchs in this model are active 
on the political scene. The best way to evaluate these two models, suggests Innes, is to use 
the World Bank’s governance indicators (WGI)—specifically the “indicator of government 
effectiveness” and the “indicator of control of corruption.”13
While outlining these two party systems, Innes correctly insists on a main East and West 
divergence, “The stable party competitions and Weberian states of post-war western Europe 
were founded on strong elite commitments to democracy and socially embedded through 
sustained productivity growth and universally rising living standards. But these conditions 
have never existed in central Europe.” Yet, the conceptual framework, that has usually been 
12  The rankings of public trust in politicians in NMS-5 (out of 144 countries) are the following: CZ: 138, HU: 113, 
PL: 101, SI: 133 and SK: 121 (WEF, 2014: 409). Accordingly, there was a very low turnout in NMS e.g. at the 2004, 
2009 and 2014 EP elections, the participation was 27.9-28.2-18.2; 38.4-36.2-28.9; 20.8-24.5-23.8; 28.3-28.3-20.9 
and 16.9-19.6-13.0 per cent in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia respectively.
13  The government effectiveness has decreased between 1996 and 2013 in the countries of party state capture 
(HU: 78.5-70.3, PL: 76.6-71.3 and SI: 79.5-78.9) and has improved in those of corporate state capture (CZ: 71.7-
75.1 and SK: 71.2-73.2), while the control of corruption has worsened in all cases (CZ: 76.6-62.7, HU: 74.1-64.6, 
PL: 72.7-70.8, SI: 86.8-73.7 and SK: 66.3-59.8 – 100 is the best score, WGI, 2015). See also Ugur, 2013.
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applied to the NMS in European studies has been based on “the golden age of European 
growth.” Hence, “the transition literature has often drawn more optimistic conclusions about 
the consolidation of central European states” (Innes, 2014, pp. 88,90). Given this divergence 
between Eastern and Western Europe, I would factor in, as a common denominator, the role 
of party and corporate state captures in achieving a democracy capture. In this resulting 
democracy capture, Golem parties in a hegemonic party system “legally” transform the 
democratic polity into a facade-democracy by abusing their majority. Therefore, in their 
latest overviews of the “third wave” of democratization, analysts have pointed to a decline in 
democracy in the NMS, where most of the formally electoral democracies have not become 
substantial liberal democracies.14
2 . 2  A  B i r d ’s - E y e  V i e w  o f  C r i t i ca l  E l e c t i o n s  i n  t h e  N M S - 5
A bird’s-eye view of the NMS’s party system transformations (see the detailed data in the 
respective tables) in the selected five ECE states must start with Poland—a NMS trendsetter in 
socio-economic and political transformations and the site of the first NMS critical election. In 
2005, Poland’s former governing party, the “post-communist” Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), 
was heavily defeated with a loss of 161 seats in Sejm (Lower House) while the two main so-
called critical parties gained a clear majority by winning a combined 179 additional seats. 
Since then, Poland’s Civic Platform Party (PO) and the PiS have dominated the Polish party 
system in the last three elections, winning 288, 375, and 364 of the Sejm’s 460 seats. The 
2007 and 2011 elections were already the new, second party system’s maintenance elections. 
Although the PO has been a clear winner, its majority has been constantly disputed by the 
PiS. Moreover the PO has been deeply corroded—its split-off “critical” party, the Palikot’s 
Movement (RP), won 40 Sejm seats in 2011. It cannot be excluded that in 2015, the PiS—a 
large Eurosceptic party, which also harbours some extreme-right views—would come back 
to power, as the latest EP elections also indicate, and could invite the second collapse of 
the Polish party system. By 2004, the EP elections were pre-elections for 2005. The SLD had 
already lost, receiving only 5 seats, and the PO and PiS had a combined 22 of 54 seats with 
very fragmented party participation. This shift was even more marked in 2009 with 7 MEPs 
for the SLD, and 40 MEPs for the PO and PiS (out of 50 seats), and appeared again in 2014, 
with 5 MEPs for SLD and 38 MEPs for the PO and PiS (out of 51 seats). The Polish model is 
characteristic, not just of the overwhelming weight of the Right (PO and PiS), but also of the 
large variety of Eurosceptic parties with a rather hard profile like the League of Polish Families 
(LPR), the PiS, the Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SoRP), and the newly emerging 
Congress of the New Right (KNP).15
14  See first of all the Special Issue of Journal of Democracy, e.g. the paper of Kagan with a special reference to 
Hungarian leaders “crack down on press and political freedom” (201529). See also Armingeon and Guthmann 
(2014), Gerschewski (2013), and Köllner and Kallitz (2013).
15  Poland has a long history of protest parties coming from nowhere and disappearing or transforming on the 
margin of the party system, but now KNP is a big success that indicates the widespread public dissatisfaction. Even 
more the latest presidential election in spring 2015, Andrzej Duda (PiS) has won against Bronislaw Komorowski 
(PO) with 51.55 versus 48.45 per cent.
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The profound transformation of the Slovak and Czech party system began in the second 
half of the 2000s and has continued into the 2010s. In the Slovak and Czech cases there 
was a prolonged two-step critical election, which even the latest elections have not fully 
concluded. The Slovak story began in 2006 when the dominant national-populist party, the 
People’s Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), collapsed. Slovakia’s story looks 
simple, the Smer has an increasing dominance with consecutive wins in the 2006, 2010, and 
2012 elections (50, 62 and 83 seats out of 150). But the success of the Smer is in its shy 
Eurosceptic and brave leftist-populist profile in a deeply divided, but rather pro-EU, centre-
right Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ), Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), Party 
of Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP) and Bridge (MOST-HÍD) context—a very unbalanced new 
party system. The transitory government change—the intermezzo of Iveta Radicova as prime 
minister—and the regularly emerging populist protest parties (such as Ordinary People and 
Independent Personalities (OL’ANO) reveal the fundamentally fragile character of the second 
party system. This series of three EP elections suggests the relative dominance of the Smer 
(with 3, 5, and 4 MEPs out of 14, 13, and 13 seats respectively). Yet the aforementioned 
pro-EU and centre-right parties—including Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) in 2014—are 
the dominant representatives of Slovakia in the EP (with 8, 6, and 7 seats). Although the 
Eurosceptic extreme-right is weak (with 3, 2, and 2 seats), the Eurosceptic parties, jointly with 
the Smer, are still rather strong (with a combined 6, 7, and 6 seats). Again, these EP results 
are not indicative enough, given very low participation in the EP elections (16.96 per cent, 
19.64 per cent and 13.05 per cent Slovakian voter turnout, respectively). The low turnout at 
the latest EP election, with many parties participating in the EP elections, and the lack of a 
clear and strong winner, may indicate the erosion of the second party system. Fico’s defeat 
in the recent presidential elections could foretell a further prolongment of Slovakia’s decade-
long critical elections.16
Like Slovakia, the Czech Republic also lacks a clear, strong winner, but there have been 
many clear losers in the prolonged critical elections. Of the NMS, the Czech Republic’s rapidly 
changing party landscape has the most Eurosceptic popular profile. There, a series of critical 
elections began in 2006.In 2006, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) was relatively dominant 
(with 81 seats of 200), but declined, winning only 53 seats in 2010.By 2013, the ODS actually 
collapsed—winning only 16 seats. The ODS’s main competitor, the Czech Social Democratic 
Party (CSSD)—despite its increasing weight of 74, 56, and 50 seats in 2006, 2010, and 2013 
respectively—has not become the Czech Republic’s new dominant party. Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), an extreme-left and Eurosceptic party, has maintained a solid 
share of the parliament (with 26, 26, and 33 seats). Like the KSCM, the Christian Democratic 
Union (KDU) on the other side of the aisle (with 13, 0, and 14 seats) absorbed much of the 
centre-right votes. So neither the ODS in earlier elections, nor the CSSD in later elections 
managed to secure a places as the truly dominant party. In this very fragmented party system, 
16  In Slovakia in March 2014 Andrej Kiska was elected against Robert Fico as a “protest president”, or inde-
pendent honest person. The Guardian has described him as “millionaire turned philanthropist”, http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/30/slovakia-elects-andrej-kiska-president-robert-fico.
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protest parties regularly emerged including : the Green Party (ZS) in 2006 (6 seats), the 
Coalition of (TOP) TOP in 2009 (41 seats), and the Public Affairs Party (VV) in 2010 (24 seats). 
This emergence of protest parties is even more clearly illustrated by the election results of 
the right-wing populist parties: in 2011 the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO) garnered 47 
seats and the Dawn of Direct Democracy (UPD) secured 14. Indeed, the soft-Eurosceptic ODS 
and the hard-Eurosceptic KSCM have dominated the EP elections together with 15, 13, and 
5 MEPs of 24, 22, and 21 seats, in addition to other Eurosceptic parties, which held 5 MEPs 
in 2004. The decline of Eurosceptic parties in 2014 has been slightly reduced by the Party of 
Free Citizens (SSO), which held 1 seat, rendering, a shared 20, 13, and 6 MEPs respectively. On 
the other side, 4, 9, and 15 MEPs seem to indicate a stronger support for the EU in this very 
unstable party system. The big question is whether or not this represents a real, long-term 
turn in public opinion.17
Hungary offers a classic case of critical elections. Whereas the Hungarian party system 
looked like a stable bipolar system—the two biggest parties won 85 per cent of the votes 
in the 2006 elections—this first party system actually collapsed in the 2010 elections. In 
2010, the Fidesz Party was the clear winner in a newly emerging hegemonic party system. 
The former governing party, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), was drastically cut in size; 
Fidesz gained a two-thirds majority. This collapse changed not only the party system, but 
also the entire constitutional-political system. This trend continued after the 2014 elections, 
with a subsequent two-thirds majority for Fidesz resulting in the further fragmentation 
and marginalization of Hungary’s leftist parties. Fidesz has so drastically transformed the 
electoral system and dominated the public media that its overwhelming 2014 victory has 
led to “elected autocracy.” Parallel to these changes, an extreme-right, hard-Eurosceptic 
Jobbik Party has also been strengthened, gaining a respective 16 and 20 per cent of votes 
in the 2010 and 2014 elections. Jobbik also successfully gained 3-3 seats in each EP election 
in 2009 and 2014. Similarly, as a soft-Eurosceptic party, Fidesz has also dominated at the EP 
elections, winning 12, 14, and 12 seats out of 24, 22, and 21 seats. So Hungary, which arguably 
suffered the outcomes of the global crisis the most in NMS-5 due to its high indebtedness, has 
produced the most marked turn to a national-social populism combined with both soft- and 
hard- Euroscepticism.18
Slovenia, the most complicated case, is the most developed NMS country to experience 
a recent, deep, and protracted socio-economic and party-political crisis. Even before the 
global economic crisis, at the 2008 elections, the Slovenian party system was already over-
fragmented. Fragile, multiparty coalitions were the result of the small size of Slovenia’s two 
leading parties, the Social Democrats (SD) held 29 of 90 seats and the SDS held 28 seats. 
17  In the Czech Republic, the new ANO movement led by the multimillionaire Andrej Babiš received a large 
share of the vote in the Czech parliamentary elections in 2013 and it topped also the European elections in the 
country. This result may firmly establish ANO’s place in the Czech Republic’s party system.
18  Hungary has become an “elected autocracy” due to the manipulated election, as Scheppele (2014) and 
Mudde (2014) have pointed out (see also Pappas, 2014). Certainly, Fidesz is the biggest and strongest Golem 
party in NMS.
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This unbalanced and fragmented character of the party system only worsened when each 
of the leading parties and their shaky coalitions failed to manage the impact of the global 
economic crisis. These failures produced drastic changes to subsequent election ballots. In 
2011 the Positive Slovenia (PS) and the Civic List of Gregor Virant (CV) were new entrants 
and in 2014, with the collapse of PS and the new Miro Cerar Party(SMC) joined the electoral 
arena. In contrast to these dramatic changes, Slovenians have consistently supported the EU 
in EP elections; actually, all of the country’s successful parties have been pro-EU. Thus, in 
Slovenia, high-level protest and populist activity has been combined with very low levels of 
Euroscepticism and extremism.19
A bird’s-eye view of the landscape of the transformations of NMS party systems reveals 
that many parties tried to become dominant Golem parties in hegemonic party systems based 
on the power of organized informal corruption networks, but did so only with dubious and 
transitory success—except for Hungary’s Fidesz, which reached “elected autocracy” perfection. 
It is also clear that Poland and Hungary, dominated by right-wing parties, experienced a party 
state capture, while Slovakia and the Czech Republic illustrate a corporate-state capture. 
Poland’s series of critical elections, from 2004 to 2005, occurred when the bipolar (post-
Solidarity versus post-communist) party system collapsed. Even now,  the weaknesses of their 
second party system are surfacing. The Czech Republic and Slovakia had a longer, two-phase 
process in the early 2010s.And, while Hungary presented a classic case of a critical election in 
2010, Slovenia experienced a collapse and continues to struggle with a turmoil that has not 
yet resulted in a clear winner.
These countries’ stories share many common features because, in NMS, long-term party 
identifications are weak. Thus, the short-term party preferences as actual improvisations at the 
elections have generated high electoral volatility as substitute allegiances. The consequently 
fragile parties and fragile party systems allow bigger parties to consistently abuse state power 
by using their informal networks for their own excessive corruptive gains. The most evident 
symptom of this NMS party system disease is the sudden upsurge of minor protest parties—
an upsurge that extends well beyond parties’ expected splits, mergers, and new names. 
The most acute form of this controversial de-democratization process is the emergence of 
personal parties. When voters lose their confidence in the available parties, they place their 
trust in independent, well-known, and “honest” personalities, as the voters of Slovenia have.
CONCLUSION: THE EMERGING SECOND PARTY SYSTEMS WITH BAD GOVERNANCE 
IN NMS
Instead of applying an evolutionary development model to the NMS—a practice that appears 
often in the majority of analyses regarding Eastern Europe and in the majority of the self-
portraits presented by governments and their experts—studying Eurosceptic parties reveals 
19  In Slovenia there is no light yet at the end of the tunnel at the party transformations. Miro Cerar had to 
form a large coalition government, and this government has to face the task of the radical economic reforms, 
so its future is unclear.
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the NMS’s wide divergence from the EU mainstream and an increasing divide between the EU’s 
core and its periphery. The NMS’s first party systems were fragile and their newly emerging, 
unstable, second party systems have been overburdened by competing oligarchs, clientelism, 
and kleptocracy. Parallel to positive Europeanization and democratization story is a negative 
version of de-Europeanization and de-democratization that can be identified and described in 
great detail. The key issue of party analysis in this negative version is that NMS parties have 
tried to become all-embracing Golem parties and have focused their efforts on attempts to 
build hegemonic party systems. In fact, because these parties’ informal networks extend from 
politics to the economy, to civil society, and to the media; their reach has penetrated all social 
sectors. These Golem parties, however, have produced short-lived, frequently changing, weak 
governments. Their short-term focus has led them to act responsively but not responsibly. 
This “populism from above” resulted in low performance and weak competitiveness, and 
altogether in the poor governance of the NMS.20
Ambrogio Lorenzetti presents Justice and Tyranny as the chief actors of his six famous Siena 
frescos depicting allegories of good and bad governments in both urban and rural settings. 
These frescos are timely symbols for ECE countries. The messages of Lorenzetti’s fourteenth-
century pictorial encyclopaedia—about the contrast between well-governed and ill-governed 
polities, or in recent terms, between Europeanized effective parties and degenerated, corrupt, 
and ineffective parties—are still applicable today. It is a pity that the ECE elites have not yet 
received, or have not yet been ready to understand, this very important message about the 
need for good governance based on a well-performing party system.21
20  The successive analyses of BTI (2014a,b) have pointed out that in the NMS countries there has been a 
huge gap between their level of general development (SI index) and the government capacity of management 
(MI index).
21  The figures of the Peace-Fortitude-Prudence/Magnanimity-Temperance-Justice have been presented on these 
frescos from one side and those of the Avarice-Pride-Vainglory/Cruelty-Treason-Fraud/Frenzy-Divisiveness-War 
from the other side. It is not so difficult to find the similarity between these symbolical figures of bad governance 
and the recent negative political heroes in NMS.
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TABLE 1: The Czech Republic’s parliamentary elections in 2006, 2010, and 2013 (Chamber of De-
puties, 200 seats), turnout 64.47, 62.60, and 59.48%, respectively
Party 2006 votes 2006 seats 2010 votes 2010 seats 2013 votes 2013 seats
ODS 35.38 81 20.22 53 7.72 16
CSSD 32.32 74 22.08 56 20.45 50
KSCM 12.81 26 11.27 26 14.91 33
KDU-CSL 7.23 13 4.39 0 6.68 14
ZS 6.29 6 2.44 0 3.19 0
TOP 09 -- -- 16.70 41 11.99 26
VV -- -- 10.88 24 -- --
ANO 2011 -- -- -- -- 18.85 47
UPD -- -- -- -- 6.88 14
ODS – Civic Democratic Party; CSSD – Czech Social Democratic Party; KSCM – Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia; SNK – Alliance of the Independent European Democrats; KDU-CSL – Chris-
tian Democratic Union-People’s Party, NEZDEM – Independent Democrats; ANO 2011 – Action of 
Dissatisfied Citizens; TOP 09 – Coalition of TOP 09; SSO - Party of Free Citizens; ZS - Green Party, 
VV – Public Affairs, UPD – Dawn of Direct Democracy.
TABLE 2: Czech Republic’s EP elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014 (24, 22, and 21 seats respectively), 
turnout 28.32, 28.22, and 18.20%, respectively
Party 2004 votes 2004 seats 2009 votes 2009 seat 2014 votes 2014 seats
ODS 30.04 9 (ECR) 31.45 9 (ECER) 7.67 2 (ECR)
CSSD 8.78 2 (PES) 22.38 7 (PES) 14.17 4 (PES)
KSCM 20.26 6 (GUE) 14.18 4 (GUE) 10.98 3 (GUE)
SNK 11.02 3 (EPP) 1.66 0 0.52 0
KDU-CSL 9.57 2 (EPP) 7.64 2 (EPP) 9.95 3 (EPP)
NEZDEM 8.18 2 (NI) -- -- -- --
ANO 2011 -- -- -- -- 16.13 4 (ALDE)
TOP 09 -- -- -- -- 15.95 4 (EPP)
SSO -- -- -- -- 5.24 1 (EFFD)
ODS – Civic Democratic Party; CSSD – Czech Social Democratic Party; KSCM – Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia; SNK – Alliance of the Independent European Democrats; KDU-CSL – Chris-
tian Democratic Union-People’s Party, NEZDEM – Independent Democrats; ANO 2011 – Action of 
Dissatisfied Citizens; TOP 09 – Coalition of TOP 09; SSO - Party of Free Citizens.
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TABLE 3: Hungary’s parliamentary elections in 2006, 2010, and 2014 (386, 386, 199 seats respecti-
vely), turnout: 67.83-64.39 (first and second round), 64.20-46.62 (first and second round), 60.09 
(one round), respectively.
Party 2006 votes 2006 seats 2010 votes 2010 seats 2014 votes 2014 seats
Fidesz 42.03 164 53.64 263 45.04 133
MSZP 43.21 190 21.28 59 (25.67) 29
Jobbik --- --- 16.36 47 20.30 23
SZDSZ 6.31 20 --- --- --- ---
MDF 5.04 11 1.42 --- --- ---
LMP --- --- 5.07 16 5.36 5
DK --- --- --- --- (25.67) 4
E-PM --- --- --- --- (25.67) 4
Fidesz – (originally: Alliance of Young Democrats), now Fidesz – Civic Alliance, together with 
KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party), MSZP – Hungarian Social Democratic Party; Jobbik – 
For a Better Hungary; SZDSZ – Alliance of Free Democrats; MDF – Hungarian Democratic Forum; 
LMP – Politics Can Be Different; E-PM – Together 2014 and Partnership for Hungary. There was one 
independent MP in 2006 and one in 2010. MSZP, DK, and E-PM ran with a common party list in 
2014, had 25.67 per cent on the common list, and 38 seats altogether, allocated as 29-4-4 seats 
and 1 seat was given to a liberal MP. Fidesz support, in absolute figures, from the 8.1 million elec-
torate, was: 1990 (439.481), 1994 (416.143), 1998 (1,263.522), 2002 (2,306.763), 2006 (2,272.979), 
2010 (2,743.626), and 2014 (2,142.142 and 122.638 votes from Hungarians in the neighbouring 
countries). Fidesz lost 600,000 voters, but with new manipulated electoral rules, (legislated by the 
Orbán government before the 2014 elections) the supermajority was reached again.
TABLE 4: Hungary’s EP elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014 (24, 22, 21 seats respectively), turnout 
38.42, 36.28, and 28.92%, respectively
Party 2004 votes 2004 seats 2009 votes 2009 seats 2014 votes 2014 seats
Fidesz 47.40 12 (EPP) 56.36 14 (EPP) 51.49 12 (EPP)
MSZP 34.30 9 (PES) 17.37 4 (PES) 10.92 2 (PES)
Jobbik --- --- 14.77 3 (NI) 14.68 3 (NI)
SZDSZ 7.74 2 (ALDE) 2.16 --- --- ---
MDF 5.33 1 (EPP) 5.31 1 (ECR) --- ---
DK --- --- --- --- 9.76 2 (PES)
E-PM --- --- --- --- 7.22 1 (GREEN)
LMP -- -- -- -- 5.01 1 (GREEN)
Fidesz – (originally: Alliance of Young Democrats), now Fidesz – Civic Alliance, together with 
KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party), MSZP – Hungarian Social Democratic Party; Jobbik – 
For a Better Hungary; SZDSZ – Alliance of Free Democrats; MDF – Hungarian Democratic Forum; 
LMP – Politics Can Be Different; E-PM – Together 2014 and Partnership for Hungary.
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TABLE 5: Poland’s parliamentary elections in 2005, 2007, and 2011 (Sejm, 460 seats), turnout 40.6, 
53.88, and 48.92%, respectively
Party 2005 votes 2005 seats 2007 votes 2007 seats 2011 votes 2011 seats
PiS 27.0 155 32.11 166 29.89 157
PO 24.1 133 41.51 209 38.19 207
SoRP 11.4 56 1.53 0 -- --
SLD 11.3 55 13.15 53 8.24 27
LPR 8.0 34 1.30 0 -- --
PSL 7.0 25 8.95 31 8.36 28
RP -- --- -- -- 10.02 40
PO – Civic Platform; PiS – Law and Justice; LPR – League of Polish Families; SoRP – Self-Defen-
ce of the Republic Poland (Samooborona); SLD-UP – Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union; 
PSL – People’s Party; UW – Freedom Union; SDPL – Social Democracy; KNP – Congress of the New 
Right; RP – Palikot’s Movement (Ruch Palikota). In 2005, German minority had two seats, in 2007 
and in 2011 had 1-1 seat.
TABLE 6: Poland’s EP elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014 (54, 50, and 51 seats respectively), turnout 
20.87, 24.53, and 23.83%, respectively
Party 2004 votes 2004 seats 2009 votes 2009 seats 2014 votes 2014 seats
PO 24.10 15 (EPP) 44.43 25 (EPP) 32.13 19 (EPP)
PiS 12.67 7 (UEN) 27.40 15 (ECR) 31.78 19 (ECR)
LPR 15.92 10 (NI) -- -- -- --
SoRP 10.78 6 (NI) 1.46 0 1.42 0
SLD 9.35 5 (PES) 12.34 7 (PES) 9.44 5 (PES)
PSL 6.34 4 (EPP) 7.01 3 (EPP) 6.08 4 (EPP)
UW 7.33 4 -- -- -- --
SDPL 5.33 3 2.44 0 -- --
KNP -- -- -- -- 7.13 4 (NI)
PO – Civic Platform; PiS – Law and Justice; LPR – League of Polish Families; SoRP – Self-Defen-
ce of the Republic Poland (Samooborona); SLD-UP – Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union; 
PSL – People’s Party; UW – Freedom Union; SDPL – Social Democracy; KNP – Congress of the New 
Right.
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TABLE 7: Slovakia’s parliamentary elections in 2006, 2010, and 2012 (National Council, 150 seats), 
turnout 54.7, 58.83, and 59.11%, respectively
Party 2006 votes 2006 seats 2010 votes 2010 seats 2012 votes 2012 seats
SMER-(SD) 29.1 50 34.79 62 44.41 83
SDKÚ-(DS) 18.4 31 15.42 28 6.09 11
SNS 11.7 20 5.07 9 4.55 0
SMK-MKP 11.7 20 4.33 0 4.28 0
HZDS-(L’S) 8.8 15 4.32 0 0.93 0
KDH 8.3 14 8.52 15 8.82 16
SaS -- -- 12.14 22 5.88 11
MOST-HID -- -- 8.12 14 6.89 13
OL’ANO -- -- -- -- 8.55 16
SMER-(SD) – Direction-Social Democracy; SDKÚ-(DS) – Democratic and Christian Union (and 
Democratic Party); SNS – Slovak National Party; SMK-MKP – Party of Hungarian Coalition; 
HZDS-(L’S) – People’s Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia; KDH – Christian Democratic Mo-
vement; SaS – Freedom and Solidarity; MOST-HID –Bridge (a Hungarian and Slovak Coalition) and 
OL’ANO – Ordinary People and Independent Personalities.
TABLE 8: Slovakia’s EP elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014 (14, 13, and 13 seats respectively), tur-
nout 16.96, 19.64, and 13.05%, respectively
Party 2004 votes 2004 seats 2009 votes 2009 seats 2014 votes 2014 seats
SDKÚ 17.09 3 (EPP) 16.98 2 (EPP) 7.75 2 (EPP)
SMER 16.89 3 (PES) 32.01 5 (PES) 24.09 4 (PES)
HZDS 17.04 3 (NI) 8.97 1 (NI) -- --
KDH 16.19 3 (EPP) 10.87 2 (EPP) 13.21 2 (EPP)
OL’ANO -- -- -- -- 7.46 1 (NI)
NOVA -- -- -- -- 6.83 1 (ECR)
SaS -- -- -- -- 6.66 1 (ALDE)
SMK-MKP 13.23 2 (EPP) 11.33 2 (EPP) 6.53 1 (EPP)
MOST-HID -- -- -- -- 5.83 1 (EPP)
SNS 2.01 0 5.55 1 (NI) 4.55 0
SMER-(SD) – Direction-Social Democracy; SDKÚ-(DS) – Democratic and Christian Union (and De-
mocratic Party); SNS – Slovak National Party; SMK-MKP – Party of Hungarian Coalition (Party of 
Hungarian Community in 2014); HZDS-(L’S) – People’s Party-Movement for a Democratic Slova-
kia; KDH – Christian Democratic Movement; SaS – Freedom and Solidarity; MOST-HID –Bridge (a 
Hungarian and Slovak Coalition); OL’ANO – Ordinary People and Independent Personalities and 
NOVA – New Majority-Conservative Democrats (KDS) and Civic Conservative Party (OKS).
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TABLE 9: Slovenia’s parliamentary elections in 2008, 2011, and 2014 (National Assembly, 90 seats), 
turnout 63.10, 65.60 ,and 50.99%, respectively
Party 2008 votes 2008 seats 2011 votes 2011 seats 2014 votes 2014 seats
SD 30.45 29 10.52 10 5.95 6
SDS 29.26 28 26.19 26 20.69 21
ZARES 9.37 9 0.65 0 - -
DeSUS 7.45 7 6.97 6 10.21 10
SNS 5.40 5 1.80 0 2.21 0
SLS 5.21 5 6.83 6 3.98 0
LDS 5.21 5 1.48 0 -- --
PS -- -- 28.51 28 2.96 0
CV -- -- 8.37 8 0.63 0
NSi -- -- 4.88 4 5.53 5
SMC -- -- -- -- 34.61 36
ZL -- -- -- -- 5.97 6
ZaAB -- -- -- -- 4.34 4
SD – Social Democrats; SDS – Slovenian Democratic Party; ZARES – New Politics-Social Liberals; 
DeSUS – Democratic Party of Retired People; SNS – Slovenian National Party; SLS – Slovenian 
People’s Party; LDS - Liberal Democracy of Slovenia; PS – Positive Slovenia (of Zoran Jankovic); 
CV – Civic List (of Gregor Virant), SMC – Party of Miro Cerar; ZL – United Left; ZaAB – Alliance of 
Alenka Bratusek. In 2008, 2011, and 2014 Hungarian and Italian minorities had, together, 2-2-2 
seats.
TABLE 10: Slovenia’s EP elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014 (7, 7, and 8 seats respectively), turnout 
28.35, 28.37, and 20.96%, respectively
Party 2004 votes 2004 seats 2009 votes 2009 seats 2014 votes 2014 seats
NSi 23.57 2 (EPP) 16.58 1 (EPP) 16.56 2 (EPP)
LDS-DeSUS 21.91 2 (ALDE) 11.48 1 (ALDE) -- --
SDS 17.65 2 (EPP) 26.66 2 (EPP) 24.88 3 (EPP)
ZLSD 14.15 1 (PES) 18.43 2 (PES) 8.02 1 (PES)
ZARES -- -- 9.76 1 (ALDE) 0.94 0
DeSUS (21.91) (2) 7.18 0 8.14 1 (ALDE)
Verjamem -- -- -- -- 10.46 1 (GREENS)
NSi – New Slovenia, LDS-DeSUS – Liberal Democracy and Democratic Party of Retired People 
in 2004, DeSUS (separately in 2009 and 2014) - Democratic Party of Retired People; SDS – Slo-
venian Democratic Party; ZLSD – United List of Social Democrats, in 2009 and 2014 SD – Social 
Democrats; ZARES – New Politics-Social Liberals; Verjamem – List I believe.
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